… On Morsi's Stick

… On Morsi's Stick

Zuheir Kseibati |

An electricity crisis and fuel shortage? Not at all. Rather a lack of immunity against escapades, recklessness and lust for power after a long period of waiting, and against the wish to jump over people's heads after having earned a certificate in riding the revolutionary wave.


An Egyptian citizen who lived through the January 25 revolution that toppled Hosni Mubarak and is getting ready for the Day of Wrath on June 30 wondered: What has changed between 2011 and 2013? On Sunday, one year will have gone by since the Muslim Brotherhood group reached power under President Morsi's cloak and once again the slogan "leave, leave" is being chanted. So, is it a second revolution?


Many in the Rebel campaign and the opposition parties hope to ensure the liberation of January 25 which was hijacked by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), knowing that the question definitely surrounds the price they will have to pay for that. Indeed, today the Mother of the World (Egypt) is not what it used to be in 2011 and the opposition's rush to ride the Rebel campaign wave is not an example to be followed, as it is repeating what the MB did with the January 25 youth.


Today’s Egypt is suffering from higher unemployment and poverty rates and going through an economic crisis, and has little hope of seeing investments settle in the country, at a time when the authority is investing in the reproduction of rivalries with all the sides. At this level, wide factions of Egyptians believe that "this authority will not learn, or would not benefit from learning, unless it takes the MB hat off" and excludes all partisan figures from the management of the state before its ship sinks.


But is there any time left to give Morsi a choice? And will yesterday's speech appease the great wrath before the June 30 events? Is it enough to replace Hisham Kandil's government to convince the street to relinquish the slogans demanding Morsi's toppling? Or is the authority fooling itself into believing that a mere apology for the mistakes committed in the process of managing the consecutive crises will generate some popularity, after it has quickly eroded since the beginning of its term?


What is certain is that even if he wants to, Morsi cannot disobey the MB Guide. And he has repeatedly proven that the palace could not contain the supporters of the group who are trading with the slogan of defending the president's legitimacy, in order to legalize the pursuit of his rivals and oppositionists on the street and inside the institutions. In addition, this mobile Inquisition which did not exclude the media platforms fostered an environment of deep fear, which is spreading panic among the majority of the Egyptians. On the other hand, the popular checkpoints to retaliate against those suspected of belonging to the MB, which were seen in Abdul Monem Riad buses station at the heart of Cairo and on the Nile cornice on Tuesday night, confirm the extent to which Egypt has entered the dark tunnel.


On January 25, the street was standing against the ruler and decades of oppression and blackmail using the bread loaf as a weapon. On June 30, and thanks to the wisdom of the victors in the ballot boxes, the confrontation has turned into war between the MB street and that of all the opponents who witnessed – throughout the past year – the fast collapse of the remaining legitimacy of the state institutions and the judiciary.


At this level, Morsi's bragging about the unleashing of freedom of expression, which turned into slander parties and accusations of treason and infidelity live on the air, probably fueled the fire of the terrifying infighting, in light of the conviction surrounding the MB's opportunism since the first day it rode the revolutionary wave.


It would be useless at this point in time to count the mistakes committed during the MB's term and the catastrophes caused by the group's rush to strengthen its presence instead of enhancing the social and economic stability of around ninety million citizens. On the other hand, it is certain that Morsi's policy towards Syria (i.e. the severance of the relations with the regime in Damascus) was a repetition of what he did during the Gaza war, thinking that pleasing the Americans will spare him from the street's wrath, or at least neutralize them in the confrontation with the oppositionists.


Now that it appears to be quasi-impossible to see Morsi stepping down to hold anticipated presidential elections – knowing that the MB has only tasted power for one year – a number of Egyptians are repeating some of the January 25 events.


And while it is unexpected that Morsi will contain his supporters to prevent killing and retaliation waves, it is also unlikely that the regime and the opposition will be able to understand the meaning of the last warning issued by Minister of Defense Field Marshal Abdul Fattah al-Sissi to "prevent Egypt's slide towards a dark tunnel of conflict or infighting." On June 30, the Salvation Front will deny its involvement in any violence because the Rebel campaign will be standing in the forefront, and the Muslim Brotherhood will do the same while its opponents burn down its offices. Indeed, what the group does best is play the role of the victim.


As for Egypt, it will remain alone and distant in a dark tunnel.